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II. ECONOMIC IMPACTS OF THE PHASE-OUT IN 2005
OF QUANTITATIVE RESTRICTIONS UNDER THE
AGREEMENT ON TEXTILES AND CLOTHING
By Margit Molnar and Przemyslaw Kowalski*
Introduction
This paper provides a quick review of the integration process into GATT 1994 of
textiles and clothing products. It also examines the most recent changes in the global
textile and clothing markets, and analyses some major strategies adopted by producers
in order to survive in the post- Multi-Fibre Arrangement (MFA) global competitive arena.
The Agreement on Textiles and Clothing (ATC) was one of the major achieve-
ments of the Uruguay Round. It put an end to a system of managed trade in textile and
clothing products that lasted for more than 40 years, first under the Long-Term
Agreement Regarding International Trade in Cotton Textiles (LTA) and then MFA. The
MFA quota system was adopted as a temporary relief measure in favour of the
domestic textile and clothing (T&C) manufacturers in the developed countries. It provided
protection for high-cost domestic industries and allowed inefficient exporters to gain
access to markets at the expense of more productive ones whose access had been
limited. The quota system prompted a scattering of global production and sourcing, and
strongly influenced locational decisions of global textile and garment producers.
Not surprisingly, the abolition of the quota system is starting to significantly
reshape the global T&C production, trade and investment landscapes by bringing about
efficiency gains. However, the benefits of the phase-out are not evenly distributed, and
for some countries may only be realized in the medium to long term; this is particularly
so, since a significant share of trade with China, the world’s top exporter of T&C
products, is still restricted by temporary quotas in the European Union and United
States markets. Efficiency gains are being realized, inter alia, through the agglomeration
of production exploiting scale economies, technology spillovers and reduction in trade
costs. Pro-competitive effects in derestricted markets are also being observed.
The consequences of the ATC phase-out differ across exporters, and their
preparedness is playing a role in how they manage to cope with competitive challenges
in more open markets. Exporters with low costs and high productivity such as China,
India and, to a lesser extent, Pakistan and Viet Nam have succeeded in benefiting from
enlarged markets, while the phase-out has brought about challenges for OECD and
small country producers. A major challenge in OECD countries is how to cope with
decreasing labour demand in the textile and clothing industries as a result of increased
competition and relocation, while in low-income countries it is how to specialize in
products and markets to stay afloat. This group of countries has been given further time
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Munro and Clarisse Legendre are gratefully acknowledged.50
for adjustment, which should be better exploited to prepare for fiercer competition in
global textiles and clothing markets, and in particular learning from the experience prior
to the phase-out.
A.  Textiles and clothing in world trade: An overview
1.  T&C industry offers opportunities for producers in countries with
differing endowments and technologies
The textiles and clothing industry is a large and diverse sector that can be
subdivided into distinct parts thus offering opportunities for countries with differing
resource endowments and technologies. The traditional division is between the produc-
tion of natural fibres, fabrics and finished clothing, although the import, distribution and
retail segments play an ever more important role in the industry’s value chain (OECD,
2004 and 2005; Nordas, 2005).
Natural fibre production is the domain of agricultural economies with access to
plants from which the fibre is produced. Synthetic fibre production depends on the ability
to innovate or adopt new technologies. Fibres are spun into yarn, and yarn is either woven
or knitted into fabric. Fabric is then finished, which involves dying, printing or softening,
among others. Fabric production is a highly automated, capital-intensive activity and is
susceptible to technological advances. Clothing production consists of cutting the fabric,
grouping it, tying it into bundles and sewing together. It is labour intensive and workers are
specialized in a limited number of tasks that are performed repetitively.
Nevertheless, cutting is often a computer-assisted process and specialized
machines are used for different types of sewing (Nordas, 2005). Indeed, as table 1
indicates, labour costs account for a higher share of costs in the clothing sector,
although capital shares are not obviously lower; however, this does not apply to the
case of Mexico, where the share of capital in total textiles cost is close to two and a
half times that of labour. The wearing apparel sector relies relatively less on intermedi-
ate inputs compared with the textile sector. Interestingly, up to 34 per cent of
intermediate inputs can be of foreign origin, which underlines the extent of international-
ization of the industry.
2.  Share of T&C in world trade is decreasing
but remains important
The T&C industry remains a significant industry in world exchanges, although its
share in world trade and its annual output growth rates have been falling over the past
few years (table 2). In 2005 – the most recent year for which consistent data are
available – world trade in T&C amounted to US$ 481 billion, or 4.7 per cent of world
exports, compared with 6 per cent and 5.3 per cent in 2003 and 2004, respectively.
T&C still plays an important role in trade of OECD countries, amounting to 3.5 per cent
of their merchandise exports; however, such trade is more critically important for many
developing countries where the share of T&C in total exports can reach more than 60
per cent. The share in OECD’s trade was 3.5 per cent in 2005 (table 3), which was
below the world average; however, this masks a considerable reliance on T&C ship-
ments by countries such as Portugal, Greece or Italy with shares of between 9 to 13
per cent in their total exports.51
Table 1.  Cost structure of firms in the textiles and wearing apparel sectors
Unit: %
Primary factors Intermediate inputs
Skilled Unskilled Total
labour labour labour Capital Domestic Imports
Textiles sector
China 1.5 9.2 10.6 11.6 66.9 10.9
Japan 6.5 17.4 23.9 7.4 58.5 10.2
India 2.7 17.6 20.3 6.6 67.9 5.2
Canada 2.9 21.4 24.3 9.7 36.5 29.4
United States 4.3 19.6 23.9 10.9 56.2 9.1
Mexico 1.9 11.3 13.2 31.1 49.1 6.7
EU15 (average) 4.6 17.3 21.9 7.8 35.9 34.4
Wearing apparel
China 2.4 17.5 19.9 12.0 60.5 7.7
Japan 3.9 21.7 25.6 11.5 56.0 6.9
India 2.9 20.9 23.8 7.8 66.0 2.4
Canada 4.7 24.6 29.3 9.8 36.9 24.0
United States 5.7 20.9 26.6 6.2 54.1 13.1
Mexico 1.4 9.1 10.5 29.0 56.1 4.4
EU15 (average) 4.0 18.3 22.2 8.3 35.6 33.9
Source: GTAP 6 database, base year 2001.
Table 2. World exports of textiles and clothing 2003-2005
2003 2004 2005
Value (US$ billion) 418 466 481
Percentage of world exports 5.96 5.25 4.75
Percentage change for year before 15.1 11.47 3.15
Source: United Nations Comtrade Database, 2007.
In contrast to the OECD area, low- and middle-income countries in East Asia,
the Pacific and South Asia record particularly high shares with countries such as
Bangladesh, Pakistan or Sri Lanka recording shares of, respectively, 84 per cent, 63 per
cent and 48 per cent. The high reliance on T&C shipments underlies the important role
that this sector plays in development and trade integration of these and other developing
countries. More broadly, developing countries account for more than 50 per cent of
world textile exports and, as pointed out by WTO, “in no other category of manufactured
goods do developing countries enjoy such a large net-trading position” (World Trade
Organization, 2006).52
The EU25 and the United States are the two main destination markets for T&C
products, accounting respectively for US$ 185 billion and US$ 84 billion, or 44 per cent
and 20 per cent of world imports in this category in 2005.1 Other important importers
include Hong Kong, China with nearly 7 per cent of world’s imports, Japan (6 per cent),
and China (5 per cent). Canada and Mexico each account for approximately 2 per cent
of world imports. Remarkably, 2003 and 2004 – the two years that preceded the phase-
out of ATC quotas – recorded high growth rates in the textile trade of around 12 per
cent, while in 2005 those rates reverted to 2-3 per cent.
The world’s largest single country exporter of T&C products in 2005 was China,
with US$ 107 billion or 22 per cent of world exports, followed by Hong Kong, China,
with US$ 40 billion (8 per cent). Yet, the EU25 as a group remains the most important
exporter with US$ 149 billion or 32 per cent of world exports. Other OECD countries
with high shares are the United States (4.6 per cent of world exports), Turkey (3.9 per
cent), the Republic of Korea (2.9 per cent), Mexico (2 per cent) and Japan (1.7 per
cent).
Table 3. Textiles exports as a percentage of total merchandise exports, 2005
By country grouping % 20 countries with
highest sharesa %
Bangladeshb 84.0
All countries – total 4.8 Pakistan 63.9
Benin 60.5
All high-income 3.5 Sri Lanka 47.5
High-income, non-OECD 7.2 Mauritius 40.8
High-income, OECD 3.1 Tunisia 32.7
OECD 30 3.5 Guatemala 30.9
Albania 30.4
Low and middle income, East Asia and Pacific 10.3 Morocco 26.9
Low and middle income, Europe 5.7 The former Yugoslav
Low and middle income, Latin America and Republic of Macedonia 26.4
Caribbean 3.3 Mongolia 26.1
Low and middle income, Middle East and Jordan 25.8
North America 3.1 Turkey 25.8
Low and middle income, South Asia 24.7 Romania 19.0
Least developed countries 3.5 Moldova 17.8
Bulgaria 17.7
India 17.3
United Republic of Tanzania 16.1
China 14.1
Hong Kong, China 13.5
Portugal 13.4
Source: United Nations Comtrade Database, 2007.
a Countries for which the data were available for 2006.
b Data are for 2004.
1 It should be noted that the import and export shares for EU25 referred to in the two following
paragraphs include intra-EU25 trade.53
3.  Phase-out of MFA quotas under ATC
(a)  ATC phase-out concludes integration of T&C trade into GATT rules
The 10-year period of eliminating quantitative restrictions on imports of textile and
clothing set out in ATC ended on 1 January 2005. ATC was designed to regulate the
transition between MFA – an agreement that came into force in 1974 as a replacement of
the Long-Term Agreement Regarding International Trade in Cotton Textiles signed in 1962
– and a full integration of textiles and clothing products into the GATT rules.
Even though MFA was aimed at an orderly opening of restricted textile and
clothing markets, it was a major departure from the basic GATT rules and, in particular,
the principle of non-discrimination and application of quantitative restrictions instead of
tariffs. The MFA quotas were applied almost exclusively to imports from developing
countries, an application which was also against the pro-development spirit of GATT. The
discriminatory nature of MFA, the historical importance of textiles in the process of
industrialization and the comparative advantage that many low-wage countries displayed
in the labour-intensive segments of textile production created a situation where, as
Reinert (2000) pointed out, the inclusion of ATC in the Marrakech Agreement was seen
as crucial to the success of the Uruguay Round in the minds of many developing
country members of WTO.
Integration of textiles products into GATT 1994 was considered the main pillar
through which ATC was supposed to deliver market opening. For the European Union,
Canada, Norway and the United States, which carried the MFA restrictions into ATC,
the integration of a product into GATT 1994 had two consequences (World Trade
Organization, 2004). First, any quantitative restriction maintained on such a product
under ATC was eliminated. Second, the transitional safeguard mechanism could not be
invoked any more with respect to imports of such a product.2 For WTO members who
did not maintain quotas under MFA, the effect of implementing integration programmes
was to remove the possibility of having recourse to the transitional safeguard mecha-
nism.
Products were to be integrated in four cumulative steps – 16 per cent of the
1990 volume of trade by 1 January 1995, 33 per cent by 1 January 1998, 51 per cent
by 1 January 2002 and 100 per cent by 1 January 2005.3  In this regard, a back-
loading was built into the system, as the last 50 per cent of the volume integration was
scheduled to occur on 1 January 2005. Additionally, the choice of products to be
liberalized at each stage was left to the concerned countries as long as the integrated
2 ATC regulated the application of transitional safeguards, in the form of quantitative restrictions
that could be utilized also by countries that had not maintained quotas under MFA on imports
of products covered by ATC and which cause serious damage or a threat thereof to the
import-competing domestic industry. Such restrictions appear to have been important only for
selected bilateral trade flows involving mainly the United States and some Latin American
countries in the first half of the ATC period. In fact, in ATC Stage 3 (1 January 2002 to 1
January 2005) there were only two recourses to this mechanism, both by Brazil.
3 Norway eliminated all restrictions in three quicker steps – 1 January 1996, 1 January 1998, 1
January 1999 and 1 January 2001. For Norway the potential effects of integration of products
into GATT 1994 became equivalent to members who did not carry over the restrictions but
retained the right to use the provisions of Article 6 of ATC on the transitional safeguard
mechanism.54
items comprised four categories of products: (a) tops and yarns; (b) fabrics; (c) made-up
textile products; and (d) clothing. Yet, the relatively broad product coverage of ATC
implied – especially in its initial phases – that the integration of products into GATT did
not necessarily cover the products on which MFA quotas existed in the first place.4 In
addition, different MFA quotas had different restrictiveness, which was demonstrated by
varying quota fill rates; those non-binding quotas were the ones to be integrated first.
Furthermore, the commitments were set in terms of volumes, not values, which implied
that the first two stages of ATC were characterized by integration of low-value added
items (Reinert, 2000).
Taken together, these rules appear to have created possibilities of postponing the
liberalization of the most sensitive products and, indeed, the first two stages of ATC
were skewed away from clothing products that have the highest low-skilled labour
content (Reinert, 2000). Yet, while many would like to have seen a more gradual
integration of T&C products over the ATC period, the back-loading of the liberalization
process should not have been unexpected, since some of the restricting countries had
made clear from the start that they intended to integrate the most sensitive products
at the end of the 10-year period, i.e., on 1 January 2005 (World Trade Organization,
2004).
In addition to the integration of textiles and clothing products into GATT, ATC
accelerated the annual growth rates of quotas carried over from MFA. These growth
rates were supposed to be increased by 16 per cent by 1 January 1995, 25 per cent by
1 January 1998 and 27 per cent by 1 January 2002. What this pillar of ATC meant was,
in practice, that if the quota was set to increase by 6 per cent annually5 under MFA it
should increase by 6*1.16=6.96 per cent annually under the first phase and by
6.96*1.25=8.7 per cent annually under the second phase of ATC, and so on. Whether
this system of quota growth has delivered significant liberalization is disputed. As per
Nordas (2005), quoting Reinert (2000), the accumulated aggregate increases of the
quotas over the ATC period in the European Union were 18 per cent and in the United
States 25 per cent above the levels that they would have been with the continuation of
MFA.
There has been full compliance with the quota growth rate and volume integra-
tion commitments at each ATC stage. However, as indicated in Textiles Monitoring Body
reports to the Council for Trade in Goods (World Trade Organization, 2004), despite the
fact that ATC had provisions and encouraged quicker liberalization, most importing
countries had not gone beyond the minimum liberalization required for each stage. In
fact, the most sensitive products were only liberalized at the end of 2004.6
4 Many analysts have pointed out that the choice of products covered by ATC and included in
the Annex to the Agreement could be seen as working against the objective of liberalizing
trade in textiles and clothing. The list included some products that had never been subject to
restrictions in any bilateral agreement under MFA. In effect, the list from which the ATC
countries selected products for integration at each stage was wider than the list of products
actually restricted under MFA by any individual importer.
5 Under MFA, the restricted textile and clothing were limited to 6 per cent annual
growth, although in exceptional circumstances these growth rates could be set at lower
levels.
6 Nevertheless, Canada, for example, has reported integration going beyond the set minima in
its submissions to the Textiles Monitoring Body of WTO.55
If the number of phased-out quotas could be taken as a proxy for the extent of
liberalization, the figures provided in table 4 – reproduced from a communication by the
International Textiles and Clothing Bureau (ITCB), an intergovernmental organization of
developing countries exporting textiles and clothing – would suggest that back-loading
was even more significant than would be suggested by the agreed cumulative integrated
volume targets. The United States would integrate 89 per cent of the quotas it had in
1990 only in the final stage of ATC; in the case of the European Union and Canada, it
would be 70 per cent and 79 per cent, respectively. In any case, it is clear that even
though ATC was successful in phasing-out the MFA quotas, the process was not
gradual and the major reform occurred at the end of the ATC existence.
Table 4.  Pace of quota abolition
(As contained in the communication from ITCB members)
United States EU Canada Norway
Total number of quotas at start of ATCa 937 303 368 54
Of which phased out:b
(a) Stage 1 (from 1995):
By integration under Article 2.6 0 0 8 0
By early elimination under Article 2.15 46
(b) Stage 2 (from 1998):
By integration under Article 2.8(a) 3 21 26 0
By Article 2.8(a) and Article 4 2
By early elimination under Article 2.15 10C 8
(c) Stage 3 (from 2002):
By integration under Article 2.8(b) 69 57 42 0
By Article 2.8(b) and Article 4 2
Under bilateral agreements 13
Under AGOA 17
Total number of quotas abolished as of March 2004 103 91 76 54
Quotas to be abolished on 1 January 2005 834 212 292 0
Source: World Trade Organization, 2004.
a Including specific limits and sub-limits notified under Article 2 of ATC.
b Numbers do not include product categories for which quotas have been eliminated only partially.
c Eliminated only for Romania, not for any other restrained member.
(b)  Timing and cross-country distribution of economic benefits remain difficult to identify
Overall, despite the back-loading, ATC was an unquestionable improvement over
MFA. Yet, the timing and cross-country distribution of its economic benefits remain
difficult to pin down, which is, in part, related to the complexity of the changes it
triggered. First, each of the four countries that carried the MFA restrictions into ATC set
them on the basis of different product classifications. Second, they maintained different
initial quotas that were not related to their bilateral trade potential in any particular way.
Third, they set different annual quota growth rates. Fourth, at the product category level,
some limits were specified in the number of imported items, some in square metres and
some in kilograms, making the assessment of their restrictiveness and cross-country56
comparisons extremely difficult. Fifth, existing quotas could have been changed in the
interim as long as the targets set for integration stages were obeyed. All these factors
imply that the extent of restrictiveness of MFA, and consequently the extent of
liberalization brought about by ATC, was specific to each individual bilateral trade
relation. Hence, it should be borne in mind that the concept of a generalized assess-
ment of the economic impact of MFA and ATC is limited.
4.  Post-ATC policy changes in the United States and
European Union markets
On the one hand, the developments in the first few months immediately
following the final stage of ATC were predictable given the back-loading of quota
removal. On the other hand, their precise magnitude could not be foreseen, among
others, for the reasons given in the preceding paragraph. During January-March 2005,
for example, imports by the United States of cotton trousers from China increased by
1,500 per cent and those of knit cotton shirts by 1,250 per cent compared with their
levels recorded during the same period in 2004.7 Other low-cost producers that have
significantly increased their exports to the United States include Bangladesh, India,
Indonesia, Pakistan and Viet Nam, among others. In late April 2005, the United States
Committee on the Implementation of the Textile Agreement (CITA) began considering
requests for safeguard action on seven product categories imported from China.
Approximately one month later, quantitative limitations on imports of seven textile
categories were established through 31 December 2005 and bilateral negotiations with
China were requested. Upon receipt of the request, China agreed to limit its exports
to a level not greater than 7.5 per cent above the amount shipped during the
preceding 12 months.
The bilateral talks between the United States and China that were concluded in
November 2005 resulted in a memorandum of understanding in which reintroduction of
temporary quotas for 21 product categories was agreed under the special T&C
safeguard clause of China’s WTO accession protocol. The temporary quotas were
imposed on several items including cotton shirts, cotton trousers and underwear. They
were reported to cover 90 per cent of imports restricted in 2004. Depending on the
product category, the agreement allowed for an increase of between 173 per cent and
640 per cent in the biennium 2004-2006, between 12.5 per cent and 16 per cent in
2007, and between 15 per cent and 17 per cent in 2008.
Similar to the United States, in the European Union the beginning of 2005
brought about significant increases of imports from China. The highest percentage
increases with respect to the first quarter of 2004 were recorded for pullovers (534 per
cent), men’s trousers (413 per cent), blouses (186 per cent) and bed linen (164 per
cent). Investigations for evidence on market disruptions caused by the surge of imports
from China were initiated at the end of April 2005 and a memorandum of understanding
was reached in June 2005. The agreement limited, until end 2007, China’s exports in 10
product categories for 2005, 2006 and 2007, with annual quantity growth rates ranging
from 10 per cent to 12.5 per cent from the base imports level in April 2004-March 2005.
The restricted items included pullovers, men’s trousers, blouses, T-shirts, dresses,
brassieres, flax yarn, cotton fabrics, bed linen, and table and kitchen linen.
7 Based on communications of the US Department of State.57
Hence, the additional transitory protection provided to the domestic textile
industry through the reintroduction of quantitative restrictions in the European Union will
be one year shorter than in the United States. There are also differences in product
coverage that are likely to differentiate the third-country impacts. For example, the
United States restricted cotton knit shirts while the European Union did not; the
European Union restricted dresses while the United States did not. While one should
not perhaps be reading too much into these differences, it is possible that to a certain
extent they do influence the differential impacts that the new quantitative restrictions
have on third-party textile suppliers competing with China in the European Union and
the United States markets, such as Bangladesh, India or Viet Nam.
5.  Major post-ATC changes in T&C trade in the European Union and
United States markets
After the initial shock, the European Union quotas curbed the surge in imports
from China. However, China’s competitors are being put under increasing pressure each
year.
Even with the reintroduction of temporary quotas, 2005 and 2006 brought about
significant changes in the European Union and the United States markets. The value of
China’s textiles and apparel exports to the EU25 increased by 43 per cent in 2005,
which was the largest increase across all the suppliers. This surge was mainly driven by
apparel products, which grew by 45 per cent, while textiles exports increased by 22 per
cent. India and Viet Nam have also experienced growing exports amounting to 18 per
cent and 6 per cent, respectively; this growth was largely driven by wearing apparel.
Other exporters that enjoyed small increases were the United States, Turkey and
Bulgaria (figures I to III).
However, for most of the other suppliers, the value of exports to the EU25
decreased in 2005. One group of countries with negative impacts include those enjoying
some sort of preferential access to the European Union market, such as: (a) Morocco
(-7 per cent) and Tunisia (-13 per cent), both of which are parties to the Euro-
Mediterranean Partnership Agreements; (b) Bangladesh (-5 per cent), which enjoyed
duty and quota-free market access within the Everything but Arms initiative: and (c)
Mauritius, which enjoyed preferential access granted to the ACP countries.8 Neverthe-
less, several other suppliers such as the Republic of Korea (-24 per cent), Australia
(-29 per cent) and Thailand (-8 per cent) also faced decreasing demands for their
shipments.
Remarkably, the negative 2005 trends in the EU25 market were reversed in
2006 for almost all suppliers. The value of Chinese exports grew by 13 per cent – a
marked slowdown from the previous year – and the value of exports increased for
most other suppliers including Bangladesh (30 per cent), Viet Nam and Hong Kong,
China (47 per cent each), Sri Lanka (21 per cent), Cambodia (16 per cent), Pakistan
(13 per cent) and Mauritius (10 per cent). This likely illustrates the impact of the
temporary quotas, which apparently had succeeded in curbing the surging imports
from China only in 2006. This is likely to do with the fact that even though a quota
8 Box 2 provides a discussion of Madagascar’s textiles and clothing industry, its reliance on
preferential trade and ways of coping with the MFA phase-out.58
for 2005 was also established, it was based on the import level during April
2004-March 2005, which covered the first three months of China’s unlimited access to
the market.
As far as the most current data (January-March 2007) are concerned, there was
an increase in the imports of textiles and apparel from China of 36 per cent over the
same period in 2006, which suggests acceleration with regard to the rate of growth for
the whole of 2006 (22 per cent). If only apparel is taken into account, the acceleration
in growth rates is from 13 per cent to 39 per cent. This suggests that with the increases
in the temporary quotas, China’s competitors in the EU25 market are under increasing
pressure. This is also visible in the rates of export growth calculated for these suppliers,
which, especially in apparel, were much lower in the first quarter of 2007 than they
were in 2006.
In the United States market, 2005 and 2006 brought about even larger increases
in imports from China. The value of textiles and apparel imports from China increased
by 54 per cent in 2005, which was the largest increase across all suppliers. This surge
was mainly driven by apparel products, which grew by 70 per cent, while textiles
exports increased by 29 per cent. The impacts on third countries in the United States
market give a clearer picture with Bangladesh, Cambodia, India, Indonesia, Pakistan and
Viet Nam all increasing their exports by between 6 per cent and 29 per cent. With the
exception of India and Pakistan, this trend is quite clearly driven by apparel exports
since, in fact, most of these countries’ exports of textiles have declined. Many suppliers
lost market shares, including the Republic of Korea (-26 per cent), Turkey (-9 per cent),
NAFTA members Mexico (-7 per cent) and Canada (-8 per cent), Caribbean
Basin Initiative countries (-4 per cent), Central American Free Trade Agreement
(CAFTA) (-4 per cent), Guatemala (-7 per cent) and Honduras (-2 per cent) (figures III
and IV).
In contrast to the EU25 market, 2006 did not bring about a reversal in these
trends in the United States market, even though the increase of imports from China was
halved from 54 per cent in 2005 to 21 per cent in 2006. In fact, for many Asian
suppliers other than China the growth rates of exports increased with regard to 2005.
This was the case for Bangladesh, Indonesia and Viet Nam, among others. At the same
time, the decline in exports for countries such as Mexico, Canada and Turkey was more
pronounced in 2006 than in 2005.
The data for 2007 confirm the conclusions drawn already for the European
Union: increasing quotas on Chinese imports put increasing pressure on other suppliers.
In January-March 2007, imports of Chinese apparel grew by a high of 63 per cent from
the same period in 2006 – almost as quickly as in 2005. It can also be observed that in
many countries that were losing their market shares in 2005 and 2006, this process has
continued in 2007 at an even faster pace (figures III and IV).
The fact that many of the exporters that experienced declining exports to the
European Union following the abolition of quotas in 2005 were gaining back their market
shares in 2006, and that a similar situation did not happen in the United States market,
might suggest that the temporary measures introduced by the European Union might
have been more binding although they varied by product category.59
I(b). Percentage change
Figure I.  EU25 imports of textiles by country and region, 2005 and 2006
I(a). Value in billions of Euros
Source: Eurostat COMEXT, 2007.






























































































































































Figure II.  EU25 imports of apparel by country and region, 2005 and 2006
II(a). Value in billion euros
Source: Eurostat COMEXT, 2007.
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Taiwan Province of China61
III(b). Percentage change
Figure III.  United States imports of textiles by country and region, 2005 and 2006
III(a). Value in billion United States dollars































































































































































Figure IV.  United States imports of apparel by country and region, 2005 and 2006
A. Value in billion United States dollars
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B.  Survival strategies
The post-ATC setting has provided an opportunity for all exporters to compete in
global markets under more equal conditions, although the temporary quotas that were
reintroduced by the European Union and the United States during the course of 2005 did
not make the quota removal process complete. In addition, tariff and non-tariff barriers on
textile and clothing products persist at levels that are higher than in other sectors.
The economic implications of T&C quota removal differ slightly across different
theories of international trade. The “traditional trade theory” would predict increased
specialization between countries with different endowments or technologies of produc-
tion. Capital-abundant countries, for example, would tend to specialize in capital-, skill-
and research-intensive segments of the industry.
The predictions of the “new trade theory” are not very different: high-income
countries would also tend to concentrate on industries with high levels of innovation and
in products on the upper quality segment. This specialization may be both vertical (i.e.,
differentiation by product quality) and horizontal (i.e., differentiation by product variety),
given that not only different product categories but also products in the same category
can be produced with techniques of different capital, skill and research intensities.
Nevertheless, the new trade theory allows for increasing returns to scale and product
differentiation. Countries producing differentiated products will engage in intra-industry
trade, and larger volumes of trade will be observed between countries of relatively
similar size.
The “economic geography theory”, unlike the other two theories, which do not
address the spatial implications of trade, would predict that producers in the proximity of
the large market would benefit first, leading to a formation of a core and periphery. The
core would specialize in industries with increasing returns to scale, and spillovers should
enforce the advantages of large markets as will forward and backward linkages. The
periphery will specialize in low-wage industries, industries with less product differentia-
tion and limited spillovers. This initial advantage, however, could be eroded with the
decrease in transportation costs, with the emergence of agglomeration dis-economies or
with a faster rise in wages in the core.
The analysis in this chapter suggests that the phase-out of textiles and garments
quotas indeed prompted both developed and developing country producers to adopt new
strategies in their quest for survival in the global competitive arena. On the one hand,
countries that had formerly underutilized their quotas (i.e., less efficient producers) were
put under increasing pressure to secure their markets. Formerly restricted producers
with high aggregate efficiency, on the other hand, were provided with the opportunity to
enter previously unconquerable markets. In an environment that is increasingly based on
market principles, exporting countries could choose their strategies according to their
relative strengths. Some of the strategies adopted by producers include specialization,
both vertical and horizontal, reorientation of markets and relocation overseas. Vertical
specialization, which involves differentiation by quality within the same product category,
is often achieved through the upgrading of technology. In contrast, horizontal specializa-
tion is differentiation by product variety.
The following preliminary analysis of available post-ATC data suggests that vertical
and horizontal specialization have been adopted by OECD as well as developing
producers. The strategy of reorientation of markets has been followed by many developing
country producers, while relocation has been typically adopted by OECD producers.64
1.  Vertical differentiation
A promising strategy for survival in the competitive arena, in particular for more
efficient, high-quality producers, is to differentiate their products by quality. For estab-
lished high-quality producers this mainly means withdrawing from low-cost segments and
focusing on high value-added products. For latecomers, this strategy can be pursued by,
for example, upgrading production technology. New technology facilitates achieving
higher aggregate efficiency, which in turn leads to a higher quality of every good (i.e.,
produces the quality margin). Moving up the value-added chain induces vertical special-
ization or differentiation by quality. The prerequisite for such a strategy is the acquisition
of new technology through imports or research and development, or both. Some of the
producers such as China, for example, have been very successful in adopting this
strategy; in preparation for the post-ATC trading environment, China started to import
advanced textile machines mainly from Germany and boosted research and develop-
ment investment in the textile and garments industry.
(a)  Comparison of unit prices reveals evidence for some differentiation strategies
To examine which producers chose to differentiate their products vertically, a
comparison of unit prices of different producers in third markets is performed, assuming
that unit prices reflect quality within the same product category (Ito and Fukao, 2005).
Unit prices of major exporters in major OECD markets obtained from the United Nations
Comtrade Database are compared at the 6-digit level of the HS classification for 1990-
2006, where available. Unit prices in the detailed product category are expressed in
terms of percentage of the “benchmark” unit price. These prices are then weighted by
value shares and aggregated to the 2-digit level; then the share of products, defined as
“similar” or “very different” in terms of quality from the benchmark, is calculated over
time.
In the United States market, Italian producers, for example, have clearly adopted
the strategy of vertical differentiation. Nearly 80 per cent of other competitors’ products
are less than a quarter of the Italian unit price and only a few producers approach the
Italian unit price (defined as within 10 per cent of the Italian unit price) in a limited
number of product categories.
When choosing China as a benchmark, differentiation strategies of its major
competitors in the United States can be inferred. In the clothing categories (HS 60-63),
among China’s top 10 competitors9 only Canada chose vertical differentiation into
higher-quality, higher-priced products (defined as at least double the Chinese unit price).
However, Honduras, and pre-2005 Bangladesh and Pakistan decided upon lower-priced
(defined as less than half the Chinese unit price) product, as shown in figure V(A).10
Figure V(B) shows that during the past 10 years, India and Indonesia have been
exporting products to the United States that are of similar quality as those from China,
while Bangladesh, Pakistan and Viet Nam started adjusting their prices to those of
China as of 2005. By 2006, more than half of all clothing exported to the United States
market had a unit price very close to that of China (defined as within a 10 per cent
range of the Chinese unit price).
9 Italy is not among China’s top 10 competitors.
10 In the case of Honduras, the lower pricing may be related to geographical proximity.65
Figure V.  Positioning strategies of selected major competitors of China in the
United States market, 1997-2006
A. Few exporters able to undercut Chinese prices (share of products with less than half the
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This strategy of “following” Chinese prices became particularly apparent after
2005, while in the era of protected markets the share of such products was a mere 15
per cent (2001). Viet Nam, which was previously a lower-cost producer (with more than
80 per cent of its clothing exports to the United States being less than half of the
Chinese unit price prior to China’s entry into WTO), has increasingly been producing the
same quality products as China. It is interesting that these countries that have not
differentiated themselves from China, or have tried to lower their unit prices relative to
China, have gained market shares in the United States while countries that appeared to
have differentiated themselves by producing more expensive and presumably higher-
quality products, lost shares.
(b) Easily differentiable product categories show trend towards polarization
in all G3 markets
A look at the detailed level of product categories reveals that the strategies
adopted by exporters differ largely by product. In some product categories where it is
relatively easy for consumers to differentiate by quality due, to a large extent, stronger
branding, there is a clear vertical differentiation among producers. A typical example is
silk neckties, where the difference between unit prices can be as large as 20 times.
Figures VI A-C show that in the three markets examined (Germany, Japan and the
United States), there is a trend towards “polarization”; high-quality, high-cost producers
succeed in maintaining substantial market shares while medium- to low-cost producers
in general are losing to China. Such evolving market structures reflect product differen-
Figure VI. Polarization of necktie prices
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tiation by quality as well as fierce competition in the lower-price segments. Different
price elasticities of consumer demand may also carry some explanatory influence in the
choice of major exporters.
Notwithstanding some major common strategies of suppliers in the G3 markets,
slight differences across markets remain. In the German market, Italy’s rising unit prices
for silk neckties since 2001 has led to a decline in its market share from 60 per cent to
slightly above 40 per cent just in five years. Nevertheless, Italy remains the largest
exporter. China is catching up fast, however, with its market share having reached
nearly 36 per cent by 2006. Viet Nam is the third largest exporter with rapid market
share gains. In the Japanese market, there is a clear “polarization” trend; high-cost
producers such as France, Italy and the United Kingdom are maintaining their market
shares, while medium- to low-cost producers are losing out to China. Notwithstanding
China’s rapid gains in terms of market share (from 0.1 per cent in 1990 to more than
27 per cent in 2005), Italy succeeded in maintaining its share above 50 per cent. The
biggest loser in the Japanese silk necktie market is the Republic of Korea, with its
market share declining from nearly 28 per cent in 1993 to 0.3 per cent in 2005.
In the United States market, Italy’s share has more than halved during the past
15 years (from 65 per cent in 1991 to 30 per cent in 2006); however, Italy’s share
remains high despite the slight increase in the unit price. During the same period,
China’s share increased from about 1 per cent to 58 per cent with only slight decreases
in the unit price. Similarly, in the United States market, high-cost producers such as
France and the United Kingdom have maintained their market shares while medium- to
low-cost producers’ shares have dropped sharply. The Republic of Korea is a major
loser also in the United States market, with its share falling from above 25 per cent to
less than 2 per cent during the five years to 2006.
(c)  Prices of less differentiable products converge in Germany and Japan
In other product categories, where vertical specialization may be less feasible
due to the difficulty for consumers to differentiate between products by quality, unit
prices have converged. A typical example is men’s cotton shirts, where prices of
different producers had come very close to each other in the German market by 2006.
The convergence in unit prices was accompanied with changes in market positions of
major exporters, particularly since 2005. The biggest gainer in the German market is
China, which increased its market share by 650 per cent from 1990 to 2006, to reach a
share of above 14 per cent in 2006. The bulk of the market share gain by China was
realized between 2004 and 2005 as a result of the phasing out of quotas. Bangladesh,
which was previously the biggest player, had been overtaken by not only China but also
India and Turkey by 2006. Apart from China, some other producers previously con-
strained by quotas such as India, Indonesia, the Lao People’s Democratic Republic,
Malaysia, Myanmar and those in proximity such as the former Yugoslav Republic of
Macedonia, also gained market shares. Some smaller players exited the market very
likely due to economies of scale and/or high transportation costs. (This may be the case
with many Latin-American producers, such as Barbados, Bermuda, Bolivia and Cuba,
which abandoned the German market).
The variation in unit prices of men’s cotton shirts in the Japanese market is
similarly limited. Although Japan has not imposed quotas, there have been significant
changes in market shares of major exporters over the past decades. The most
important change is China’s gain, its market share increased from a third in 1990 to69
over three-quarters in 2005. At the same time, other countries such as India, Malaysia,
Thailand and the United States lost market shares and some high-cost producers (e.g.,
Belgium and Finland) exited the market. Given the fact that Japan did not impose
quotas, this process can be considered as driven by market forces and characterized as
survival of the “fittest”.
(d)  Much less convergence in the United States
In the United States market, the convergence of unit prices for men’s cotton
shirts has been less extreme than in the German or the Japanese markets. Although
prices of the most expensive exporter (Switzerland) can be as much as 50 times higher
than the prices of the cheapest exporter (Jamaica), their market shares are negligible.
The top 20 producers in terms of market share set prices within the range of 300 per
cent of the lowest price with the exception of Italy, which differentiated into higher-quality
segments, and set its prices above 400 per cent of its competitors’ average unit price
and more than 1,000 per cent of the lowest price.
It appears that the different post-2005 unit price evolution patterns of men’s
cotton shirts in the German and United States markets might be best explained by the
different trade policies adopted in reaction to the surge of Chinese imports after the
phase-out of quotas. While both the European Union and the United States re-imposed
quotas on Chinese products in 2005, the product categories subject to quotas differed.
The United States target included woven shirts while the European Union target did not.
This has resulted in more enhanced competition in this product category in Germany,
while in the United States exporters not subject to quotas can offer lower prices than
can their Chinese competitors (and maintain higher market shares). In Japan, where the
most efficient suppliers have not been restrained by quotas, unit prices of different
suppliers move together.
2.  Horizontal specialization
As a result of enhanced competition in major markets, many producers chose to
concentrate on fewer product categories in their quest to increase their market shares in
those markets. Apart from the efficiency gains related to the reduction of import
sources, such a strategy also allows better exploitation of economies of scale, thereby
benefiting both importers and producers.
The extent of the similarity of the different producers’ export structures is
important, as it heavily influences their positions in third markets. Two countries with a
very similar export commodity structure, for example, can differentiate their products by
quality or, if their qualities are also similar, can enter into price competition in global
markets. In addition, they can geographically slice markets. This latter strategy, however,
is usually not voluntarily chosen by exporters, but is driven by transportation costs or
other factors such as bilateral or regional agreements, historical or cultural ties etc. One
possible measure of the degree of similarity is the Kreinin-Finger (1979) index. If the
commodity composition of two countries’ exports is identical, this measure takes a value
of 100, while in case of complete dissimilarity the value of the index is 0. As producers
face different competitors in different destination markets, the similarity of export
structures is examined by market. In addition, given that the textile and clothing
industries generally need different endowments, similarities in exports of these two
commodities need to be looked at separately.70
(b) China and India closer to OECD producers’ export structures but further
from each other in Germany
In general, the major competitors’ export structures have become more similar in
the German market over time, but there are some clear trends of horizontal differentia-
tion in some product categories. In the textile market (HS 50-59), the most significant
trend is the move by China up the value chain; while in 1990, it showed little similarity
with other producers except Hong Kong, China, by 2006 its export structure has
become closer to that of Italy or Poland. Bangladesh and India also export increasingly
similar textile commodities as other producers to Germany, nevertheless the overlap of
their exports with those of other countries still remains low. The developments in the
clothing (HS 60-63) segment show a somewhat different pattern. Bangladesh reduced its
overlap with other countries except Italy and Turkey between 1990 and 2006.
China, on the contrary, exports increasingly similar products to Germany as
those from high value-added producers such as Belgium, Italy and the Netherlands, and
less similar ones, for example, to those of India. India, while it has reduced its overlap
with China over the past 15 years, has increased it with Italy and the Netherlands.
These findings suggest that there is a certain degree of horizontal differentiation in the
German clothing market – lower-cost producers try to avoid competition with each other
and, instead, move into product categories supplied by higher-cost exporters.
A glance at a more disaggregated (2-digit) level reveals that the overlap between
Chinese and Indian exports has been limited in non-knitted or crocheted clothing (HS
62) and the other made articles (HS 63) categories. Even in knitted or crocheted
clothing it has decreased. Analysis of 4-digit data further indicates that the decrease of
overlap between Chinese and Indian exports to Germany is, to a large extent,
attributable to the withdrawal of Indian producers in several categories (including
women’s ensembles, brassieres etc.).
(c)  A clear trend of horizontal differentiation among most suppliers in the United States
Trends in the United States textile and clothing market are somewhat different
from those in Germany. In particular, among textile exporters there is a clear horizontal
differentiation. In 1991, China, India and Pakistan exported very similar products and the
overlap between exports from Honduras, Hong Kong, China and Indonesia was also
significant. Mexico and Indonesia also had some similarities, but exports by Bangladesh
were very distinct. By 2006, the overlap between exports from Bangladesh and other
countries had increased somewhat, but remained very low. Moreover, the export
structures of all the other countries (except that of Mexico and Viet Nam, and Mexico
and Canada) have become increasingly dissimilar.
In clothing, the general trend is a decreasing overlap of products but the export
structure of China has come close to identical to those of other exporters such as
Mexico and India. The same tendency is observed for Indonesia and Viet Nam as well
as Hong Kong, China and Viet Nam. This can be explained by the increasing range of
products that China and some other exporters deliver to the United States market.
Another clear trend is the significant decrease of the overlap between Honduras and
most other suppliers. In 1991, Honduras had a very similar export structure to
Bangladesh, Canada, China, Hong Kong, China, Indonesia and Mexico; however, by
2006, it only had high overlap with Hong Kong, China. Honduras, being a small country
with a limited variety of products it could produce with reasonable economies of scale
as well as inadequate backward linkage facilities and heavy reliance on imported71
fabrics, had not been able to increase the range of goods to the extent its competitors
had done. It has even exited some product segments (e.g., men’s cotton pyjamas)
during the past 15 years (see box 1).
Box 1. Impact of ATC phase-out in Honduras
By restricting the export growth of competitive clothing industries, MFA quotas
opened the door to the global market for the apparel sector in Honduras. Given these
preferential trading conditions, foreign investment from the United States and Asia
helped to establish a thriving apparel industry in Honduras. The removal of MFA quotas
and the associated erosion of preferential access triggered a decline, causing the
Honduras’ share of the United States market to decline from 3.09 per cent in 2004 to
2.57 per cent by 2006. Additionally, the country’s impressive escalation from the United
States’ thirty-first largest supplier of apparel products in 1991 to the seventh largest
supplier in 2002 stalled and then slipped to tenth largest supplier in 2006 (United
Nations Comtrade Database, 2007). Despite the country’s close geographic and
business relations with United States apparel firms, MFA expiration threatens the
adolescent textiles and clothing industry. Strengthened relations with international
companies and increased investment in the textile industry and vertically integrated
enterprises, however, could support Honduras’ struggle with global competition.
The collective shift of the Caribbean Basin (namely, Central America and the
Caribbean) into the apparel industry began in the 1950s. At the time, new govern-
ment policies promoted offshore production, and United States apparel firms showed
increased interest in the Caribbean’s cheap labour supply and geographic proximity.
In the 1960s and 1970s, export-oriented industrialization became more popular
among Latin American governments, prompting the growth of many export-processing
zones (EPZs). However, export-led growth did not take hold until 1984 when the
Caribbean Basin Initiative improved political stability and economic cooperation with
the United States. The Special Access Programme, more widely known as the 807
Rule, further contributed to the sector’s development in 1986 by allowing low-income
countries such as Honduras to export unlimited amounts of apparel to the United
States if the apparel was made from United States-cut fabrics. Following the
introduction of this rule, “production-sharing” became a common practice for Carib-
bean apparel industries.
Currently maquiladoras are the most common type of apparel firm in Hondu-
ras, and they have made a notable contribution to the decrease of the country’s high
unemployment. While this initially augmented the growth of apparel sectors, the raw
material conditions discouraged development of many local textile sectors, thus
hindering the possibility of developing full-package manufacturing plants. Despite the
incentives structure that promoted imports of fabric, several firms have integrated
backwards by acquiring fabric production plants, thus demanding an expansion of the
Honduras textile industry (Bair and Peters, 2006). Textile integration has granted
autonomy to many Honduran companies although the textile industry as a whole
remains in an infant state. As of 2005, CAFTA had encouraged the development of
the textile industry by authorizing the use of raw materials from any member country.
These developments appear to have strengthened the roots of the Honduran apparel
industry and fortified its response to MFA expiration. Yet, Asian competitors have
operated vertically integrated enterprises for decades.
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Box 1.  (continued)
Foreign involvement in Honduran clothing production has solidified the country’s
role in the global apparel market. United States investment in Honduran export-
processing plants has played an integral part in the preliminary transfer of industrial
technology and the development of United States-Honduran trade relations since the
1990s. As illustrated in table 5, the United States has monopolised Honduran exports
since granting preferential treatment in 1991, taking advantage of the short lead times
generated by the geographic proximity of Honduras. A study by Ozden and Sharma
(2006) found that 8.5 per cent to 9.5 per cent of the average export price increase in
Honduras, Costa Rica and the Dominican Republic could be attributed to United States
preferential access schemes. Asian investors have also shown a strong interest in
Honduras, funding the majority of Honduran textile factories. As Chinese companies look
to expand globally, the Honduran clothing industry offers an attractive investment
because of CAFTA’s duty-free access to the United States market.
The stagnation of most Caribbean Basin apparel sectors since 2000 mirrors
the progressive expiration of MFA quotas. Honduras’ growth rates have slowed as
well, relative to the exponential growth rates achieved in the 1990s, but the industry
has concurrently adapted and advanced in recent years to prepare for increased
levels of global competition. Honduras’ progression from production sharing to full-
package manufacturing and, especially, to vertically integrated production is central to
this development. A vertically integrated industry comprising local production of
textiles offers Honduras a strong competitive advantage over regional competitors
who have not evolved from United States-dependent maquiladora production, a
vulnerable form of enterprise plagued by low barriers to exit.
While Honduras has achieved record growth rates and captured market share
from other Caribbean Basin competitors such as Jamaica and Haiti, the concentration
of quota-sensitive apparel products in the last stage of MFA expiration posed a
significant threat. Knitted T-shirts, knitted jerseys, and sweaters comprise the majority
of Honduras’ export product range (Bair and Peters, 2006). As these products
previously were protected by high quota constraints, Honduras now faces direct
competition from China. Product differentiation would help to protect Honduras in the
global market, but the industry has made limited efforts in that direction.
Table 5.   Top 10 destinations of Honduran apparel exports
(Unit: Percentage)
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
United States ..98.9 97.2 97.1 96.8 97.6 97.6 97.8 97.4 97.7 97.2 96.8 96.0 95.9 93.8 93.4 95.1
Canada 15.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.7 0.9 0.9 1.2 1.2 0.9 1.3 1.8 1.4 1.8 1.8 2.2
Casta Rica .. .. .. .. 0.6 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.3 1.0 1.0
Mexico 36.5 0.3 0.1 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.7
Belgium .. .. .. .. .. 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.7 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.4 0.6
Japan 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.3 ..
United Kingdom .. .. .. 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.3 0.2 ..
France .. .. .. .. 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2 ..
Guatemala .. .. .. 0.4 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.4 0.3 0.2 ..
Germany 37.1 0.5 0.6 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2
Total top 10 0.0 0.2 0.4 0.5 0.7 1.0 1.3 1.8 2.0 2.3 2.5 2.6 2.7 2.7 2.9 2.9 2.7
Source: United Nations Comtrade Database, 2007.73
(d) In world markets, Chinese exports have become less similar to those of
Bangladesh or India
To complement the above analyses of similarities of export structures, the
Spearman correlation coefficients of revealed comparative advantage (RCA) indices of
the top 10 exporters and their most dynamic competitor, China, are calculated. The
correlation index takes values between +1 and -1, with positive values showing that a
country specializes in similar products as China and with negative values showing
dissimilarity of export structures. As figure VII indicates, China’s textile export structure
has become less dissimilar to that of the United States as a result of China’s move into
higher value-added textiles segments. At the same time, China is exporting increasingly
similar products to those of India and Italy and less similar products to those of
Bangladesh and Hong Kong, China. These findings support the catching up hypothesis:
China is moving into more capital- and technology-intensive product segments and is
improving the quality of export goods. The Spearman correlation coefficients of RCAs in
the clothing market reveal some different trends (figure VIII). Compared with 1995,
China exported more products in 2005 that were dissimilar to those exported by Italy,
Mexico, Turkey and the United States, and less dissimilar ones compared with France.
The similarity with Bangladesh and India, on the other hand, decreased during the
same period. A possible reason for this finding is that China has basically diversified its
export structure, moving into all categories and gaining export shares more rapidly than
its competitors. This could have happened by the acquisition of foreign firms that
produce a wider array of products.
Figure VII. Textile trade specialization of China vis-à-vis its top 10 competitors
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(e) China’s revealed comparative advantage in labour-intensive
products is decreasing
The revealed comparative advantage reflects a country’s relative strength in
exporting different types of commodities. The RCA index – which measures a country’s
export share for a commodity and compares it with the world export share of that
commodity – is calculated at the 4-digit level of textiles and clothing categories for
1996-2005. In design-intensive goods where quality is easily differentiable, such as
neckties, Italy has the highest revealed comparative advantage among the countries
examined. Moreover, its RCA increased during the past 10 years. Bangladesh, for
example, appears strong in labour-intensive manufactures such as men’s shirts and T-
shirts, with the highest RCA values in the group. China’s revealed comparative advan-
tage shows a declining trend in labour-intensive products such as men’s shirts and T-
shirts, and an increasing trend in neckties. This is additional support for the catching up
view. This, however, does not mean that China may not be competitive in these
segments in the world market. The RCA index simply reveals the performance of a
commodity relative to other commodities; thus, it reflects more on the pattern of
specialization rather than competitiveness per se. In other words, Chinese textiles and
garments may be competitive in the world market, but other industries may be even
more competitive. India’s RCA has also increased for neckties, although it is still very
low. India also shows an increasing RCA in T-shirts, but its RCA in men’s shirts has
decreased.
Figure VIII. Clothing trade specialization of China vis-à-vis its top 10 competitors
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3.  Reorientation of markets
During the quota system under ATC, the major way to expand export markets by
the most productive producers was to enter into new markets or increase sales in
markets that did not impose quotas. Before 2005, this led to a diversification trend of
export markets for rapidly-growing producers such as China. With the phase-out of
quotas, these producers started to gain market shares in Canada, Europe and the
United States, and a larger share of their exports was directed to these markets. As
figure IX indicates, countries previously restricted by quotas (such as Bangladesh, China
and India) have reversed their trend of market diversification to market concentration in
2005. This reversal was sharper for Bangladesh and India, whose top 10 export markets
had been countries with quota restrictions. China, on the other hand, had important
markets such as Australia, Hong Kong, China, Japan and the Republic of Korea that did
not impose quotas among its top 10 markets; therefore, the reversal towards market
concentration is not as drastic as India’s. On the contrary, countries not affected by
quotas, such as the OECD members, did not show any significant change in their
export market structure in 2005.
The phasing out of quotas has also brought about temporary market share gains
for less efficient producers. As theory suggests, quotas add extra margins to the export
price and limit the export volumes to quota-imposing countries, while there is excess
Figure IX. Producers previously restricted by quotas consolidate
their export markets
Percentage share of top 10 export markets in total textile and garment exports
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capacity in the rest of the world (assuming that at least some of the producers expand
production at a faster pace than market growth in the markets affected by quotas, as
has been the case), bringing down prices. Lower prices create extra demand in those
countries. With the removal of quotas, the logic is supposed to work the other way
around – exports to the previously quota-imposing countries should surge due to
redirection from non-quota imposing countries. The example of China clearly illustrates
this fact; in 2005, there was a sharp increase in the share of China’s exports to
Canada, Europe and the United States while some other major markets, such as Japan
and the Republic of Korea, had a smaller share of exports. It should be noted, however,
that in the case of Japan this was also due to the fact that Chinese exports grew much
faster than Japanese demand.
(Continued)
Box 2. Uncertain times for Malagasy apparel
Madagascar offers a prime example of a low-income country drawn into the
apparel industry by MFA quota protection and preferential treatment schemes. By
limiting competition from other exporting countries and redirecting foreign investment
to Madagascar, these programmes have facilitated the global establishment of this
emerging industry. Madagascar is a particularly interesting case because of its
dramatic growth period from 1990 to 2001, during which its clothing sector was one
of the fastest growing industries in sub-Saharan Africa. In 2002, the industry endured
a severe downturn due to a political crisis, and then rebounded to pre-crisis export
levels by 2004 due to the depreciation of the Malagasy currency (a temporary
defence against the pending MFA expiration). To surmount the long-term implications
of MFA expiration and compensate for the country’s reputation for political instability,
Madagascar should increase the industry’s competitiveness by (a) boosting invest-
ment and vertically integrating the textile industry, (b) promoting synergies within the
export-processing zones and smaller companies, and (c) specializing in niche prod-
ucts that circumvent direct competition with China.
The swift development of Madagascar’s clothing industry in the 1990s can be
attributed to three main factors. First, Malagasy exports were promoted as an
alternative to exporting countries restricted by the Multi-Fibre Arrangement. Second,
duty-free access for clothing imports to the European market was granted by the
European Union Cotonou Agreement programme and reaffirmed in 2001 by the
“Everything but Arms” (EBA) initiative. Last, Madagascar profited from the Africa
Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) programme, which granted duty-free access to
the United States market for clothing products from sub-Saharan Africa, with a
provision for the use of local fabric until September 2007. The impact of AGOA on
Madagascar’s clothing industry is evident from the increase in foreign investment after
the scheme was announced in 1997 and the 114 per cent growth in Malagasy
apparel exports from 1997 to 2001 (Tait, 2002).
Stimulated by these programmes, Madagascar has established itself in the
global clothing market, primarily in the role of an apparel assembler. The industry
grew from a handful of factories in the 1980s to approximately 115 factories in 2005
(Sedowski, 2006). Meanwhile, the country’s textile industry remains underdeveloped
due to insufficient cotton production and lack of investment in production technologies
by Madagascar. The country’s three textile mills cannot meet demand, so most77
(Continued)
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production units are imported from China, a low-cost alternative, and Mauritius, a
qualifying LDC AGOA supplier.
The Multi-Fibre Agreement first facilitated the establishment of Madagascar’s
apparel industry by promoting triangular manufacturing arrangements. In response to
MFA quota restrictions, middle-income countries began to subcontract all or part of a
project to less developed countries, thus developing fledgling industries such as
Madagascar’s apparel sector. As Malagasy apparel firms became more established,
they capitalized on these investments by forming direct relationships with buyers,
particularly from Europe.
The growth of Madagascar’s clothing industry is also largely attributed to
foreign investment from Mauritius, which was attracted by Madagascar’s cheap labour
supply. Concurrently, Madagascar’s thriving French expatriate population facilitated an
influx of foreign investment into the expanding industry. Asian investors (chiefly China,
Malaysia, Pakistan, Singapore and Hong Kong, China), quickly followed suit in the
1990s. In addition, since the launch of AGOA, several Middle Eastern companies
(particularly from Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates) have also invested in
the Madagascar apparel sector (Tait, 2002).
Among the various national development initiatives, the introduction of EPZs
in 1990 had the greatest impact on the growth of the clothing and textile industry.
Taking advantage of MFA quota protection, duty-free inputs for 95 per cent of exports
attracted many new market entrants and the development of three major production
centres. These government-subsidized zones aimed to increase foreign investment
through duty exemptions, tax deferral and drawback schemes, and a 10-per cent tax
on dividends (Tait, 2002). The EPZs of Madagascar and Mauritius have been
particularly successful in that they offer EPZ benefits to firms that are located
anywhere in the country. Interestingly, the EPZs still suffered in the 2002 political
crisis because of the industry’s low barriers to exit, but they were also the best
equipped to bounce back (Cling and others, 2005).
Despite the apparel industry’s quick recovery after the political crisis, the
ability of the country to withstand the expiration of preferential treatment schemes is
unclear. Madagascar’s physical infrastructure severely limits the development of the
textile and clothing industry. This involves rent, electricity and administrative costs,
and Madagascar’s overhead charges have become a serious consideration for
potential investors. The country has an inefficient transportation system; the road
system is deficient, port facilities are in poor condition, and export lead times are
long because the country is not on a direct shipping route (exports must be shipped
via Durban in South Africa). In addition, the country’s deficient training facilities are
limiting the development of skilled labour and contributing to the industry’s low
productivity rates.
 Despite infrastructural setbacks, however, exports to the European Union
market have grown since 2004. Interestingly, exports to the United States have
concurrently fallen (figure X). Madagascar’s share of the United States market fell
from 0.38 per cent in 2004 to 0.25 per cent in 2006, primarily because of a decrease78
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(Continued)
Similar to the case of Honduras (see box 1), vertical integration may offer
hope for the future of the Malagasy clothing industry. Madagascar’s clothing factories
could integrate with the country’s few textile production facilities and handful of
accessory manufacturers. This would require expansion of the domestic cotton
industry, a factor that was expected to become more pertinent after the AGOA fabric
provision phase-out in September 2007. HASYMA, the national cotton production
organization that was privatized in 2004, has announced plans to boost future cotton
production. Developing domestic fabric production would make Madagascar more
competitive in the global market because the country’s current fabric orders from
India and China delay production by three to five weeks. Significant technological and
infrastructural advancements would be necessary, however, to reduce Madagascar’s
Box 2. (continued)
in knitted or crocheted apparel and accessory exports. Meanwhile, the share in the
German market, the third top destination for Malagasy 2005 exports, increased from
0.09 per cent in 2003 to 0.16 per cent in 2006, due to a gain in market share of the
same product category. The slight decrease in the German unit price of these
products has not discouraged growth, while a dramatic drop in price from US$ 16.90
in 2004 to US$ 3.90 in 2006 has visibly impaired exports of this category to the
United States. – United Nations Comtrade Database, 2007.79
4.  Relocation of production facilities
The quota system under ATC was an important determinant of the location of
foreign direct investment (FDI) in textiles and garments. Multinationals aiming at re-
exporting to the host country had been constrained in increasing their investment in
countries where quotas were binding, and they had been forced to expand in countries
that may have had lower production efficiency. Similarly, exporter countries with high
productivity but full utilization of quotas established production facilities in countries with
lower productivity but under-utilized quotas or in countries not subject to quotas. This
resulted in dispersed production of textiles and clothing around the globe, implying
inefficiencies.
The removal of the quota system, not surprisingly, accelerated the efficiency-
enhancing consolidation wave that had started earlier in the industry. This consolidation/
relocation wave, together with declining trade barriers, has also been driven by
decreasing services costs, including transportation, and has allowed for further slicing of
the value-added chain (Jones and Kierzkowski, 1990). Production plants both from low-
cost, low-productivity and high-cost, high-productivity countries are relocating to the most
productive, relatively low-cost countries.
The move to a more efficient global production system, however, involves
adjustment costs that may be sizeable in the short term. These adjustment costs may
incur in the form of output and employment losses related to relocation overseas. Using
Box 2. (continued)
current lead-time on orders (six to seven weeks) to an efficiency level competitive
with Indian and Chinese suppliers.
The apparel industry’s chance of long-term survival would also improve by
increasing synergies between Madagascar’s many small, adolescent companies.
USAID has initiated the JUMPSTART programme to promote the development of
small and mid-sized firms. Meanwhile, the European Union has developed a cluster-
ing organization called Text’lle Mada, to facilitate the pooling of knowledge and
product specializations. The cluster appears to have increased the apparel sector’s
competitiveness in the global market by decreasing costs and by uniting companies
in offering a broader range of services to overseas clients and competing with China
for large orders.
Product specialization would also increase Madagascar’s competitiveness in
the global market. Wadding, felt, non-wovens, yarns, twine and cordage, which have
been exported to Germany since 1994, offer a potential niche market for Madagascar.
These products comprised 0.12 per cent of the German market share and 0.02 per
cent of the United States market share in 2006. While nearly all categories of apparel
exports are growing, this product category remains a minor export category for China.
Additionally, Madagascar can offer a price advantage, exporting for US$ 1.70 to the
German market versus China’s average unit price of US$ 4.40 (United Nations
Comtrade Database, 2007). Further investment in the development and promotion of
these products in the United States and European markets would allow Madagascar
to sidestep Chinese competition.80
time series industry data, Molnar and others (2007) estimated the labour market
impacts in OECD countries of overseas relocation and found that there was heterogene-
ity across industries. Robust to the way of specification, the findings show that
employment in the services industries is positively affected by moving overseas, while in
the manufacturing sectors the effect depends on whether the sector has strong
commercial ties (in terms of the share of imports and outward FDI) with non-OECD
countries. In the industries with the strongest ties with non-OECD countries, such as
textiles and garments, food and beverages, electronics and transport equipment, there is
a strong negative effect of outward investment on domestic employment, while in other
manufacturing industries such as pulp and paper, chemicals, metals and machinery, no
significant impact is found.
Furthermore, according to the study, in sectors with strong ties to non-OECD
countries, increasing relocation overseas raises long-term wage elasticity as well as the
speed of adjustment of domestic employment. In the services sectors, on the contrary,
overseas investment reduces the speed of adjustment of domestic employment. The
above findings suggest that in certain manufacturing industries, particularly textiles and
garments, overseas and domestic employment may be substitutable to a certain extent,
while in services they are somewhat complementary. Analysis of the relationship
between overseas and domestic employment in the G3 countries shows that they are
somewhat complementary in the United States and substitutes in Japan, while for
Germany there are no significant results.
C.  Conclusion
This chapter provides a preliminary insight into the economic impacts of the ATC
phase-out in 2005 and the strategies adopted by exporters in its anticipation. It is clear
that developments in the first few months immediately following the last stage of ATC
were inspired by the back-loading of quota removal. The increases of imports to the
European Union and the United States of several hundred or even several thousand per
cent on many textile and clothing items prompted the introduction of temporary
safeguards that intermittently overturned or slowed down the adjustment process. The
fact that some of the exporters who experienced declining exports to the European
Union following the abolishment of quotas in the first few months of 2005 were gaining
their market shares back in the 2006, and the fact that this did not happen in the
United States market where the trends from 2005 continued, suggests that temporary
measures introduced by the European Union might have been more binding even
though it is also clear that impacts varied by product category.
Temporary quotas have curbed the surge in imports from China, but each year
China’s competitors in these markets are put under increasing pressure. As far as the
most current data (January-March 2007) are concerned, in both the European Union
and the United States markets an increase in the imports of textiles and apparel from
China are observed from the same period in 2006, which suggests acceleration with
regard to the rate of growth for the whole of 2006.
The anticipation of the new post-MFA environment based on market principles as
well as the liberalization already effectuated within ATC prior to 2005, prompted an
adoption of new survival strategies. A promising strategy adopted by mainly high-cost,
high-quality producers was vertical specialization. Whether this strategy can be adopted
largely depends on the type of the product; where consumers can differentiate by
product quality (e.g., silk neckties), it has been seen as a successful choice, but where81
it is hard for consumers to differentiate across different qualities, price competition arose
instead. For this latter type of product (e.g., men’s cotton shirts and T-shirts), China
emerged as the major supplier, forcing other exporters to lose market shares or exit the
market.
As vertical specialization appears to be a viable option mainly for high-quality
producers, some exporters in the lowest segments have adopted horizontal specializa-
tion to maintain or gain market shares. This appears to be the strategy in particular for
smaller producers who cannot possibly compete in a wide range of products due to
limited economies of scale. To exploit economies of scale in production and transporta-
tion, for these producers it is essential to identify their niche products with comparative
advantage and focus on fewer destinations. Relocation of production facilities now
targets lower-cost, high-productivity large-size countries. Multinational enterprises have
long since started this process and had been limited in such expansion by the quota
system. Relocation from low-income, low-productivity countries is not yet seen as a
major trend; however, with the removal of quota restrictions, a certain degree of
consolidation is foreseen in low-cost, high-productivity countries.
The consequences of the phase-out differ across exporters, and their prepared-
ness is playing a role in how they manage to cope with competitive challenges in more
open markets. Exporters with low costs and high productivity such as China, India and,
to a lesser extent, Pakistan and Viet Nam have succeeded in benefiting from enlarged
markets, while the phase-out has brought about challenges for OECD and small-country
producers. A major challenge in OECD countries is how to cope with decreasing labour
demand in the textile and clothing industries as a result of relocation, while in low-
income countries the challenge is how to specialize in products and markets in order to
stay afloat. This latter group of countries have been given further time for adjustment,
which should be better exploited to prepare for fiercer competition in the global textile
and clothing markets, especially by learning from the experience prior to the phase-out.82
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